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Abstract
In the past 20 years, two related literature strands have gradually moved centre stage of the attention of EU Studies
scholars. The first is preoccupied with the ‘politicization of European integration’, a multi-faceted concept that aims to tie
together a multitude of political and societal manifestations underlying an increasing controversiality of the EU. A second
concerns the parliamentarization of the EU, referring to the changing (institutional) role and EU-related activities national
parliaments engage in. The key point of this contribution is simple, but often overlooked: We can and should be seeing
parliamentarization as a necessary, yet insufficient, component of a wider process of politicization. Doing so goes beyond
the often ad hoc or pars pro toto theoretical assumptions in both literature strands, sheds new light on the normative
consequences attached to these phenomena, and furthers a more complete understanding of how a ‘comprehensive’
politicization of European policies develops.
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1. Introduction
It is by now long overdue to state that the EU no longer
flies under the political and societal radar. What was
once characterized by a stance of indifference (or a ‘per-
missive consensus’) by the wider public, has slowly but
steadily turned into an expansion of the scope of conflict
surrounding the EU (De Wilde, 2011a; Hooghe & Marks,
2009). This change has its origins somewhere around the
mid-1990s and has become a focal point of scholarly at-
tention since the failure of the Constitutional Treaty in
2004. ‘Politicization’ was argued to have kicked in, refer-
ring to a state of political and societal debate character-
ized by features such as an increasingly polarized pub-
lic, frequent media visibility, electoral positioning, and
Euro protests. All of this directed towards the EU itself
or particularly salient policies, which together was seen
as an “awakening of the sleeping giant” (Van der Eijk &
Franklin, 2004). Since then, politicization scholars have
set out the task of conceptualizing this complex phe-
nomenon, constructing analytical frameworks to study
its forms and appearances, explain its origins and dynam-
ics, and evaluate the (normative) consequences (for con-
ceptual overviews see De Wilde, Leupold, & Schmidtke,
2016; Gheyle, 2019).
During the same time period, a different but related
literature strand focused on the role and EU-related activ-
ities of national parliaments in the EU multilevel system.
The emphasis here is on how national parliaments adapt,
institutionally, to take pressures of European integration
into account, but also on thequestionofwhether andhow
they are actively engaging with EU policy-making. The lat-
ter occurs by scrutinizing their governments, or commu-
nicating European policies much more frequently—here
labelled as ‘behavioural’ parliamentarization (Auel, 2015;
Goetz & Meyer-Sahling, 2008). All of this despite or be-
cause of the fact that they had initially been labelled the
‘losers of European integration’, to the benefit of execu-
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tives and/or the European Parliament (Maurer &Wessels,
2001). The further strengthened formal role of national
parliaments through the Lisbon Treaty (Neuhold & Smith,
2016) and the visible part some parliaments have played
in recently salient episodes, such as the CETA-saga (Bollen,
2018), have only fuelled the attention.
This contribution takes issue with the relationship
between these two developments—(behavioural) parlia-
mentarization and politicization—from a conceptual and
analytical point of view. The key point is simple, but ar-
guably often overlooked: We can and should be seeing
(behavioural) parliamentarization as a necessary, yet in-
sufficient, component of the politicization of European
integration or specific policies, and not as separate, in-
dependent, processes that react to each other. In other
words, (behavioural) parliamentarization is not equal to
politicization, but a ‘comprehensive’ understanding of
politicization cannot exist without it.
We ‘can’ make this link, first of all, because the con-
ceptual and analytical contributions in both literature
strands show very clear overlaps, which often go unrec-
ognized when looking from one point of view. Crucially,
we also ‘should’ re-conceptualize the relationship as fol-
lows, as this: (i) goes beyond ad hoc or pars pro toto the-
oretical assumptions that are sometimes used in these
literature strands; (ii) sheds new light on the norma-
tive consequences usually attached to them; and (iii) fur-
thers a research agenda focused on a more complete
understanding of how ‘comprehensive’ politicization of
European policies develops. In sum, this discussion is
more than a semantic exercise, as it benefits the schol-
arly discussion of which role parliaments play in salient
policies, while at the same time adding to our under-
standing of the complex politicization concept—both key
aims of this special issue.
Beyond these specific conceptual considerations,
this contribution has two more overarching goals. The
first is to trigger more fine-grained conceptual and an-
alytical reflection about two concepts that are—due
to their popularity and importance—sometimes readily
used without thorough conceptual consideration. Doing
so runs the risk of applying the same broad labels to vary-
ing empirical phenomena, hence undermining our collec-
tive knowledge. Secondly, it aims to serve as amodest re-
search agenda for studying behavioural parliamentariza-
tion as connected to wider politicization dynamics. In do-
ing so, it sets the scene for several empirically grounded
contributions in this special issue.
The article is structured as follows: Section 2 turns
to the literature on the role and EU-related activities of
national parliaments. Section 3 focuses on the ‘politiciza-
tion’ phenomenon, unpacking its multi-faceted nature,
manifestations, and settings. Section 4 then makes the
‘so what?’ of this contribution explicit: Why does it mat-
ter that we see (behavioural) parliamentarization as a
necessary, but insufficient, component of politicization?
Section 5 ends with some concluding remarks and short-
comings that can be taken up by further research.
2. Parliamentarization of the EU
To make sense of the relationship between European in-
tegration and domestic political systems, the concept of
‘Europeanization’ is commonly invoked, referring to “an
incremental process re-orienting the direction and shape
of politics to the degree that [EU] political and economic
dynamics become part of the organisational logic of na-
tional politics and policy-making” (Ladrech, 1994, p. 69).
When the object of Europeanization is the national par-
liamentary system, some authors speak of the degree of
‘parliamentarization’ of the EU. Herranz-Surrallés (2018),
for example, defines parliamentarization as the “greater
involvement of parliaments in scrutinizing and shaping
regional and global governance” (p. 31). This is a broad
interpretation, and as such, a ‘greater involvement’ can
point both to the institutional ability to be involved in the
shaping and scrutinizing of governance (e.g., Roederer-
Rynning & Schimmelfennig, 2012), or to the actual prac-
tice of shaping policy, in terms of scrutiny, coordination,
or communication (e.g., Rozenberg & Hefftler, 2016).
These ‘institutional’ responses, on the one hand, and the
‘attitudinal’ and ‘behavioural’ responses, on the other
hand, are recognized categories of the Europeanization
of national parliaments (Goetz & Meyer-Sahling, 2008).
Early contributions came to the conclusion of a de-
parliamentarization of the EU: (the appearance of) a
decreasing and eroding role for national parliaments,
increasingly unable to shape European governance
(Raunio, 2009). The argument went that national parlia-
ments were either uninterested in engaging with EU is-
sues (Auel & Raunio, 2014b), or not able to do so effec-
tively. Given that EU competences were simultaneously
growing, this would result in them being the ‘losers of
integration’ (Maurer & Wessels, 2001).
Nevertheless, several scholars documented how na-
tional parliaments actively started to ‘fight back’ by
adapting institutionally to deal with this challenge of
European integration (Raunio & Hix, 2000). They did so,
for example, by establishing specific European Affairs
Committees (EACs), increasing their informational rights
with respect to EU or national executives, or establish-
ing inter-parliamentary fora to be in a better position
to scrutinize their governments (Raunio, 2009). A con-
sensus emerged on the basic point that “national insti-
tutions have made substantial efforts in order to cope
with the requirements of the Union” (Wessels, Maurer,
& Mittag, 2003, p. 414). Raunio (2009) backs this up by
concluding in a review article that national parliaments
are now generally in a much stronger position to scru-
tinize their governments than they were in the 1990s.
Several provisions in the Lisbon Treaty with respect to na-
tional parliaments (such as the establishment of an ‘Early
Warning System’) have further strengthened this devel-
opment of ‘institutional parliamentarization’ (Neuhold &
Smith, 2016).
The more pressing question, then, is whether na-
tional parliaments actually make use of these provi-
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sions to assert themselves in the EU multi-level system.
Indeed, as Auel (2015) argues, institutional opportunities
remain latent until they are utilized. Hence, to fully make
sense of the parliamentarization of the EU, analyses of:
(i) attitudes and role conceptions of members of parlia-
ment (MPs); and (ii) their EU-related behaviour and activ-
ities over time, are necessary. First, changes in attitudes
and role conceptions of MPs can result in an increased
willingness to actually be involved in EU policy or scrutiny
of the government (Auel, 2015). In this respect, Wessels
(2005) analysed contact patterns of German MPs, their
involvement in EU policy-making and their perceptions
of the control of power over time (1997–2003), and
concluded that ‘attitudinal parliamentarization’ certainly
takes place, but only at a very slow pace.
To evaluate actual parliamentary behaviour, sec-
ondly, it makes sense to turn to the traditional parlia-
mentary functions, to see how these have evolved in
an EU context: electing governments, drafting legislation,
scrutinizing the government, and communicating to the
wider citizenry (Auel, Rozenberg, & Tacea, 2015). It is
widely acknowledged that the first two of these func-
tions do not readily apply to national parliaments, be-
cause in an EU context the European Parliament has
largely taken these over. Hence, the focus is on scrutiny
of the government, and more recently on the commu-
nicative function, to assess if and how ‘behavioural par-
liamentarization’ takes place.
When it comes to parliamentary control and over-
sight, themain conclusion is one of differentiation across
time and countries (Raunio, 2009; Winzen, 2012). Auel
et al. (2015) tested six institutional and motivational hy-
potheses on a unique dataset of 27 parliaments, and
found that it was mainly the institutional strength in
EU affairs and (more limitedly) the type of parliamen-
tary system (majority or consensus) that explained the
divergence in the time spent in EACs, and in drafting
resolutions. However, Senninger (2017) also convinc-
ingly shows that partisan competition has a defining
influence on parliamentary EU oversight, as EU issue-
based incentives across parties have been shown to
explain the content and timing of oversight activities.
National parliaments have over the years also estab-
lished horizontal links with other parliaments, resulting
in inter-parliamentary fora in order to be better able
to follow European policies and share best practices
(Raunio, 2009).
Furthermore, building on normative and democratic
concerns, it is particularly the communicative function
that has moved centre stage over the past five years
(Auel & Raunio, 2014b). Democracy depends on a lively
and viable public debate, where policy alternatives are
presented to citizens tomake informed choices. In this re-
spect, national parliaments are argued to be in a unique
position to translate EU policies, ‘bring the EU home’ and
normalize its existence (Auel, 2007; Kröger & Bellamy,
2016). As such, communication by national parliaments
(and its members) can add to the democratic legitimacy
of the EU polity as a whole. The extent to which they do
this, “and are seen by citizens to carry out such actions”
is hence arguably fundamental for the legitimacy of the
political system (Auel & Raunio, 2014b, p. 3).
However,while itmight be theoretically true that “na-
tional parliaments provide a major space for public de-
bate and are thus ideal arenas for the deliberation of im-
portant European issues” (Auel, 2007, p. 498), there is
not a great deal of empirical knowledge about whether
they actually do so. National parliaments can play this
role in different ways (Auel & Raunio, 2014b): informing
the electorate, asking parliamentary questions, or mak-
ing transcriptions of debates publicly available. A major
role is however envisioned for plenary debates. The ple-
nary is an ideal forum to articulate specific positions on
a variety of (European) issues, commonly placing them
next to other parties and politicians. The literature does,
however, acknowledge that a translation of these de-
bates to the mass media is often required to be able to
make these debates actually visible to the public (Auel,
Eisele, & Kinski, 2018).
Despite its theoretical importance, early results led
to fairly depressing conclusions. In a special issue specifi-
cally focused on the communicative function of national
parliaments, Auel and Raunio (2014b) summarized that,
generally speaking, national parliaments “seem not to
live up to their task of bringing ‘Europe’ closer to the citi-
zens or enabling them tomake informed political choices
and to exercise democratic control in EU affairs” (p. 10).
Especially in plenary debates, the EU remains “a rare
guest” (Auel & Raunio, p. 7). While some institutional
determinants seem important (such as the formal rights
granted to parliament, or the existence of a ‘talking’ in-
stead of a ‘working’ parliament, see De Wilde, 2011b),
it appears that incentive structures play a more decisive
role in accounting for plenary debates and communica-
tion in general (Auel & Raunio, 2014a; Auel et al., 2015).
In this respect, it is often the ‘public salience’ crite-
rion that reappears in analyses of the communicative
function, disguised in different topics (Auel, 2015). The
topic of the euro crisis, for example, was shown to be a
better predictor of parliamentary debates than some in-
stitutional factors, simply because the public salience sur-
rounding it was so high (Auel et al., 2015; Auel & Höing,
2014; Wendler, 2013). Miklin (2014) equally shows that
in Germany and Austria, national parliaments discussed
the EU Services Directive heavily, but only after the pub-
lic salience of the issue had grown. In EU foreign policy as
well, recent studies have found national parliaments in
different Member States heavily debated EU free trade
negotiations (with Canada and the US), but only after
the public salience of these issues had grown significantly
(Bollen, 2018; Gheyle, 2019).
All in all, the current literature documents that a pro-
cess of institutional parliamentarization of the EU has
definitely taken place while raising several questions re-
garding the existence of a pattern of attitudinal and be-
havioural parliamentarization. The former appears to be
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moving slowly, while the latter varies widely between
countries, and according to specific (salient) episodes in
time—especially when it comes to parliamentary com-
munication and debates. In other words: The ability to
deal with EU issues is, generally speaking, present, but
incentive structures seem to inhibit their use. Following
Raunio (2009), national parliaments may hence not be
‘late comers’ to the EU debate, but simply rationally not
engaging having weighed up the pros and cons.
3. Politicization of EU Integration and Policies
In the past 20 years, the so-called ‘permissive consensus’
towards European integration has abruptly come to an
end (Hooghe &Marks, 2009). Different manifestations—
listed in the introduction—are testimony of the fact that
both support for and contestation against the EU have
gradually become integral components of contemporary
societal and political life (Zürn, Binder, & Ecker-Ehrhardt,
2012). This arguably has profound consequences for
European integration and its democratic functioning. On
the one hand, scholars argue that the fact that publics
are now “looking over the shoulders” of EU elites, and
that the EU has become an element of mass politics,
constitutes a ‘constraining dissensus’ for further integra-
tion (Hooghe & Marks, 2009). On the other hand, (pub-
lic sphere) scholars see a large democratizing potential
in frequently debating (and conflicting over) the EU, and
in doing so providing citizens with alternatives, contes-
tation, and options to fight for—the core elements of
a vibrant democracy (Follesdal & Hix, 2006; Statham &
Trenz, 2015). Whatever the stance, the politicization of
European integration, in any case, seems to be under-
stood as having a profound impact on further European
(dis)integration, which makes it a key research topic for
years to come.
From an academic point of view, the first tasks
are therefore to conceptualize the politicization phe-
nomenon and its relation to ‘politics’, as well as to analyt-
ically capture its varying manifestations, in order to mea-
sure its occurrence and extent. From a conceptual point
of view, politicization implies a special case of ‘turning
something political’, combining the visible and contested
aspects of ‘the political’ (Palonen et al., 2019). The under-
lying idea is hence that the existence of the EU, or its poli-
cies and decisions, are debated and no longer escape the
wider public’s attention (Rauh, 2016). Thismeans that the
commonly executive, elite-driven process of European in-
tegration is no longer taken for granted, and frequently
falls prey to heated and mass public debate (Rauh, 2016).
Analytically, the starting point is often the contribution
by DeWilde (2011a), who defined politicization as “an in-
crease in polarization of opinions, interests or values and
the extent to which they are publicly advanced towards
the process of policy formulation within the EU” (p. 566).
Given the broad scope of this operational definition,
there is an on-going debate onhow tomeasure andmake
sense of politicization, specifically in termsof the types of
‘manifestations’ and ‘settings’ it comprises; the ways in
which the phenomenon becomes visible for researchers
to study its existence and extent (see Gheyle, 2019, for
an exhaustive discussion). Various contributions have ini-
tially led to a convergence around the idea that three
sub-processes constitute politicization: salience, actor
(or audience) expansion, and polarization (De Wilde
et al., 2016). Nevertheless, the different interpretations
that can be generated by these terms, have led to two
overarching approaches to analysing politicization: as a
purely (or predominantly) discursive phenomenon, or as
a much more encompassing phenomenon.
In the first, widely-held approach, politicization is
seen as an essentially discursive phenomenon that builds
on political communication. As Hurrelmann, Gora and
Wagner (2015) put it, in this approach, it is “not suffi-
cient that actors become aware, or able to form opin-
ions, but it must become salient in political communi-
cation that seeks to influence decision-making” (p. 45).
Applying the sub-processes here means seeing politiciza-
tion as a visible, discursive, expansion of the scope of
conflict, whereby different types of groups or political ac-
tors publicly conflict over a certain topic, fuelled by dif-
ferent opinions, ways of framing, or legitimations of the
EU or its policies (Gheyle, 2019; Statham & Trenz, 2015).
As such, the focus is on the “communicative processes
that lead to an increasing intensity and controversy of
debates” and on the settings or arenas where this can
visibly play out (Schmidtke, 2014, p. 3).
To speak of politicization in this view entails two
things: (i) there are actors present who deliberately raise
issues; and (ii) that these issues are raised in public, in
front of an audience. Politicization, therefore, does not
happen automatically but builds on societal or political
actors seeking publicity and resonance with a wider au-
dience who are able to witness these actions (De Wilde,
2011a; Statham & Trenz, 2015). Where these discursive
interventions can take place—andhencewherewe could
eventually see evidence of politicization—are in those
settings or arenas where there actually is a larger audi-
ence able to follow an unfolding debate. Parliaments, the
mass media, ‘on the streets’, town hall assemblies, or
scientific conferences all fit that description (De Wilde,
2011a). Several authors have therefore come up with a
classification of three types of settings in which to find
and study politicization: institutional, intermediary, and
citizen settings (Baglioni & Hurrelmann, 2016; De Wilde
et al., 2016).
The institutional settingmainly comprises parliamen-
tary arenas, where professional politicians engage in
political debate about different (European) issues. The
length of parliamentary debates or the polarization be-
tween different parties about core EU policies is there-
fore sometimes used as indicators of a politicized object
(Green-Pedersen, 2012; Wendler, 2013; Wonka, 2016).
The second intermediary setting serves as the link be-
tween political decision-making and the broader citi-
zenry and civil society. While there is some research on
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party manifestos (Guinaudeau & Persico, 2013) and pub-
lic protest (Hutter, Grande, & Kriesi, 2016), the main fo-
cus is on the public sphere carried by the (mass) me-
dia (De Wilde et al., 2016; Hoeglinger, 2016). With its
wide audience reach, and its central place in contem-
porary ‘audience democracies’ (Manin, 1997) the mass
media arguably serves as the primus inter pares loca-
tion to study politicization (Gheyle, 2019). Finally, the
citizen setting has been least studied (but see Baglioni
& Hurrelmann, 2016). It comprises arenas made up of
laypeople engaging with politics, coming together, for ex-
ample, in debating groups or on social media.
The main focus in politicization research in all of
these settings is on domestic arenas: national parlia-
ments; domestic public (media) spheres; or domestic
protest. This is because structural barriers, such as lan-
guage differences or the nationally structured media sys-
tems, still inhibit pan-European debates or conflict ex-
pansion. For this reason, a multitude of institutional and
agency-related variables are said to result in a “differen-
tiated politicization of European governance, in which
patterns vary substantially across settings and time”
(De Wilde et al., 2016, p. 9). This pattern has been con-
firmed in several empirical studies (see Zürn, 2018, for an
overview), and has fuelled the theoretical debate about
which structural and agency related variables may ex-
plain the divergence (Gheyle, 2019; Zürn, 2016).
Besides the discursive-centred approach, a second
approach claims that politicization analytically implies
much more than just public debate or political commu-
nication (Hooghe &Marks, 2009; Rauh, 2016; Zürn et al.,
2012). Driven by a different account of what ‘the politi-
cal’ implies, it is argued that several othermanifestations
can also point to the fact that something is politicized
(Zürn, 2016). Changing attitudes and beliefs about the
EU (or core policies), various group activities, such as lob-
bying, coalition formation, voting trends, or the (in cam-
era) parliamentary scrutiny of European issues are in this
sense also testimony of its politicization. While these ac-
counts acknowledge that communication is important,
and that politicization can play out in different settings,
they argue we need to take these other types of mani-
festation into account. Especially when we take a longer-
term view of the politicization of the EU. In Table 1, three
recurringmanifestations are summarized, with examples
of what could be seen as evidence of politicization.
The key insight here is that the three manifestations
of politicization in the institutional setting largely overlap
with the attitudinal and behavioural parliamentarization
of the EU as introduced in the previous section. The par-
liamentary communication function logically overlaps
with political communication in the institutional setting.
Increased parliamentary scrutiny of EU affairs is less visi-
ble to the wider public but is still a political activity that
implies a heightened importance of the EU or a certain
policy. Even the increasing awareness of MPs about their
role in multi-level policy-making, or about the impor-
tance of a certain EU policy, can be seen as evidence of
politicization (in the broader approach). In sum, different
types of parliamentarization of the EU can be conceptu-
alized as (as I will argue: necessary, yet insufficient) com-
ponents of a broader politicization dynamic.
This means that the choice for the narrow or broad
approach towards politicization is important to assess
the relationship between parliamentarization and politi-
cization. In the broad approach, attitudinal parliamen-
tarization and the scrutiny aspect of behavioural par-
liamentarization might be labelled particular manifesta-
tions of the politicization of the EU. While this obviously
has its merits to analyse longer-term dynamics in the EU
multi-level polity, it can also lead to contradictory ten-
dencies. Christiansen, Högenauer and Neuhold (2014),
for example, theorized that institutional parliamentariza-
tion, and the related scrutiny practices, may also result
in increased bureaucratization and depoliticization, as
tighter scrutiny practices may favour expert bureaucrats,
to the detriment of more visible and polarized political
discussions in plenary.
For this and other reasons (see Gheyle, 2019,
Chapter 2), I argue it is most helpful to think of politi-
cization in the narrow view set out above, as a primar-
ily discursive phenomenon that builds on the other man-
ifestations functioning as latent potentialities. This nar-
row approach is alsomore suited to deal with short-term
politicization phenomena, as is the case when focusing
on European policies. Doing so also clarifies the relation-
ship between (the communicative aspect of) behavioural
parliamentarization and politicization. It is visible, polar-
ized, parliamentary communication (most likely seen in
plenary debates) that is considered the (necessary, yet
insufficient) component of the broader (discursive) politi-
cization of an EU issue. In the next section, I argue that
Table 1. Examples of manifestations of politicization across different settings.
Institutional setting Intermediary setting Citizen setting
Beliefs/attitudes MP views on EU integration Expert views Public opinion
Political activities Scrutiny or follow-up Associational activity, protest, Public protest, electoral
of EU issues lobbying, coalition formation turnout, voting behaviour
Political communication Parliamentary debates Mass media, party manifestos, Layperson’s discourse
in plenary press releases
Notes: Own elaboration, inspired by Zürn (2016) and Hurrelmann et al. (2015). ‘Narrow’ approach to politicization comprises the third
row, while the broad approach comprises all three.
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we not only can but also should be seeing these phenom-
ena as intertwined.
4. The Importance of an Integrated View
In the previous part, I argued that it is analytically pos-
sible to see (the communicative aspect of) behavioural
parliamentarization as a component of a wider politiciza-
tion phenomenon. In this penultimate section, I add that
we also should be seeing the former as a necessary, yet
insufficient, component of politicization, for three rea-
sons: (i) it goes beyond often ad hoc or pars pro toto the-
oretical assumptions in both literatures; (ii) it sheds new
light on the normative consequences usually attached to
both; and (iii) it furthers a more complete understanding
of how ‘comprehensive’ politicization of European poli-
cies unfolds.
4.1. From ‘Partial’ to ‘Comprehensive’ Phenomena
A first reason to study these phenomena together is that
we no longer have to resort to ad hoc or pars pro toto
theoretical assumptions related to the original concepts.
The literature on parliamentary communication, for ex-
ample, often has to include publicly salient topics, or the
introduction of broad variables such as ‘Euroskepticism’
in order to explain the existence and extent of com-
munication (e.g., Auel et al., 2015). Arguably, it cannot
be the aim to identify—a priori—all possible salient is-
sues in order to explain this parliamentary function, nor
is ‘Euroskepticism’ a readily interpretable indication of
why some issues pop up in parliamentary debates while
others do not. Explaining parliamentary communication
makes more sense from the point of view of the issue,
rather than the institution or characteristics of the coun-
try (even though these can play mediating roles). This
could be attained by linking with the wider concept of
‘politicization’ of European policy.
Furthermore, national parliaments are not simply
passive receivers of societal pressures that they must
then translate into political action. They are an integral
cog in awider politicization dynamic, often able to decide
whether to add visibility to certain EU issues, or whether
to silence them. In his study of the EU Services Directive,
Miklin (2014) for example, found that left parties aimed
to “increase public pressure further and hence prevent
the directive from being adopted” (p. 86). De Wilde
(2014) states that “national parliaments can contribute
to the politicization of Europe by exercising their com-
municative role, but the main communicative arena that
reaches citizens is constituted by mass media, rather
than parliaments” (p. 46). It, therefore, seems almost in-
evitable that the function of parliamentary communica-
tion is studied in parallel with the study of mass media
(Auel et al., 2018).
In the politicization literature, secondly, it is often
the case that evidence of one manifestation is taken
to mean full-blown politicization. Some authors equate
politicization with political parties picking up an issue, ir-
respective of whether the issue is visible to a wider pub-
lic or not (e.g., Green-Pedersen, 2012; Hooghe & Marks,
2009). Herranz-Surrallés (2018) identifies an increasing
polarization between political parties (in the European
Parliament) and labels this as politicization.Miklin (2014)
argues that we need to assess how ‘EU politicization’
can increase in order to affect the way national parlia-
ments deal with these issues, implying that the former
is something independent from parliamentary involve-
ment. Zürn et al. (2012) label the increasing involvement
of NGOs at the international level as politicization. Lastly,
many contributions focus on the mass media setting as
the most important location to study politicization but in
doing so run the risk of narrowing the phenomenon to
media visibility (see Zürn, 2016).
Recall that politicization is a complex, multi-faceted
phenomenon, that aims to tie together different (types
of) manifestations in different settings. There is there-
fore arguably a risk in labelling something ‘politicization’
if it only manifests itself in one way or one particular
setting. Just as a complex concept such as ‘democracy’
is not reducible to one constitutive element (such as
free elections), so politicization is not present as soon as
there is ‘protest’ or ‘media visibility’. It, therefore, makes
sense to claim that political or societal debate in only
one setting should be labelled a ‘partial’ form of politi-
cization and if there is a spillover between different set-
tings (parliaments and mass media) as ‘comprehensive’
politicization. Doing so would also (partly) address the
thorny question of the ‘extent’ of politicization (What
is high or low? Is there a threshold?), by arguing that
we should at least be seeing parliamentary and medi-
ated communication.
4.2. Normative Consequences
Besides theoretical and analytical reasons, there are also
normative considerations that justify a closer connec-
tion between behavioural parliamentarization and politi-
cization. Recall that both politicization and parliamen-
tarization imply a normative, democratic component:
Widespread public debate, and the particular translation
hereof in parliament, is argued to be a constitutive force
of democratization. Here too, however, it seems incor-
rect to assume that these far-reaching beneficial out-
comes result from their partial manifestations only.
For national parliamentary debates this is acknowl-
edged, and intuitively clear: If parliamentary debates do
not spill over beyond the assembly walls, it is quite dif-
ficult to attach far-reaching normative consequences to
the fact that they have taken place.Who saw them, what
informing, aggregating, or polarizing function did they
have? As Auel et al. (2018) succinctly put it: “Despite
a remarkable increase in parliamentary involvement in
EU affairs, the added value in terms of democratic legiti-
macy will remain limited if citizens are not aware of their
activities”. While social media may have a role to play
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here (even though there is doubt regarding the extent
to which it can provide a balanced picture), the mass me-
dia remains the primary transmission channel for carry-
ing these debates to the wider public.
The same reasoning applies for those contributions
that study politicization as manifested in the primus in-
ter pares setting, the mass media. While undoubtedly im-
portant, the point is that the existence of polarized and
mediated debates about EU issues may not be sufficient
to attribute large normative consequences if, for exam-
ple, these do not imply any domestic conflict (DeWilde &
Lord, 2016).What deliberative, normative, consequences
should we attach to those debates about and between
foreign or European actors, making EU issues seem as re-
mote, or as if played out between others, and not us?
Arguably, what matters from a normative point
of view is a connection between the (deliberative)
opinion-making process and the decision-making level
(Papadopoulos, 2013, p. 77). MPs, and the parliament
itself, play a major role in (selectively) increasing the
resonance of this public debate, increasing (poten-
tial) responsiveness by executive actors. If the existing
power structures (such as governments or the European
Commission) are disconnected from (or relatedly: irre-
sponsive to) wider public debates, we should not hold
public debates in such high (normative) regard simply be-
cause they happen. This could just as well constitute a
‘dialogue of the deaf’ (Crespy, 2014), which in the end fu-
els the (perceived) lack of legitimacy of the EU (Crespy,
2016). In sum, to genuinely speak of a politicized issue,
outside debates need an inside translation, or they could
evaporate in the already crowded public sphere.
This point is backed up most explicitly by Kröger
and Bellamy (2016), who argue that what is lacking, is
not (primarily) democracy at the EU level, but a demo-
cratic (re)connection between EU decision-making and
the nationally-bound citizenry. In the current set-up, na-
tional parliaments are crucial in order to domesticate
and normalize the EU. Domestication, they argue, is
already well underway, since in their view this over-
laps with institutional parliamentarization (cf. Kröger &
Bellamy, 2016). Normalization, however, means debat-
ing “alternative EUpolicies by non-Euroskeptic parties ac-
cording to their characteristic ideological commitments”
(Kröger & Bellamy, 2016, p 14). Hence, the (beneficial)
normative consequences scholars attach to politicization
may only materialize depending on far-reaching domes-
tication and normalization of the EU. This arguably has a
better chance when the objects are specific EU policies,
where citizens can readily observe the wider societal de-
bates and how political parties deal with those in their
domestic parliaments.
4.3. Explanatory Potential
Finally, we should be linking both phenomena together
because it helps us advance a more complete under-
standing of how this ‘comprehensive’ politicization de-
velops. This firstly means looking for the conditions un-
der which a spillover from wider societal debates to par-
liamentary settings (or the other way around) occurs.
Several of such ‘spillover’ variables have already been
identified, but have not been placed into an overarch-
ing framework due to the separate evolvement of these
strands of literature. When it comes to the conditions
generally considered necessary for political parties to
pick up and openly communicate about EU issues, four
variables are raised: (i) the issue must be salient; (ii) the
party position must be in line with their voters; (iii) the
party needs to be internally cohesive on the topic; and
(iv) the competitors should take up alternative positions
(Kröger & Bellamy, 2016; Miklin, 2014).
Interestingly, the spillover from parliamentary to
wider societal settings (e.g., mass media) seems to be
based on similar considerations. Auel et al. (2018) stud-
ied different supply and (media) demand hypotheses
about when parliamentary activity is covered in newspa-
pers, and have found that there is a large role for parlia-
mentary news supply. In other words: The media is cer-
tainly interested in parliamentary debates about EU is-
sues, but there have to be such events in the first place.
Political parties or specificMPs are therefore key play-
ers. However, Kiiver (2007) argues that there is a range of
trade-offs involved for MPs that impact their decisions
to highlight EU issues, to take up contrasting positions,
and to attempt to generate an impact on EU policy out-
comes. Hence, further research should investigate not
only if plenary debates, or political communication by
MPs, about European issues takes place, but also what
the underlying motivation is to do so, and when they ab-
stain from it (see Senninger, 2017). This can be related
to party variables, such as their ideology, or their place
in government-opposition, but also to role division per-
ceptions with the European Parliament, or issue-specific
variables, such as distinctions between distributive, regu-
latory or foreign policy issues, or the way parties are able
to link (frame) EU policies to their domestic agenda.
Besides highlighting issues themselves, parties may,
of course, react to publicly salient topics, which means
we also need to take into account how societal debate
expands from initial discursive interventions, to its en-
trance in (semi-)public arenas and ultimately in parlia-
ments (Palonen et al., 2019). Recent studies on the derail-
ing of the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (Crespy
& Parks, 2017; Dür &Mateo, 2014) and the Transatlantic
Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP; Gheyle, 2019)
have shown how interest groups and social movements
succeeded in making complex foreign policy issues pub-
licly salient, after which both national and EuropeanMPs
picked it up. They point to normative framing strate-
gies, pan-European coalition formation between groups,
close ties with parliamentary actors, and outside lobby-
ing efforts in terms of demonstrations and social me-
dia campaigns.
While the previous points all suggest agency-related
variables, we also need to take into account the struc-
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tural variables which inhibit or facilitate conflict expan-
sion. In terms of parliamentary communication, for ex-
ample, the either ex-ante or ex-post dealing with EU pol-
icy issues matters significantly (De Wilde, 2011b). When
the issue is initially left to executives and the adminis-
tration, heated debates often follow at the end of the
policy cycle. When close (ex-ante) scrutiny has been paid
throughout, less conflict appears to emerge afterwards.
Gheyle (2019), furthermore, shows that Irish advocacy
groups faced enormous difficulties in getting media at-
tention for their TTIP cause, in part because of a hos-
tile media environment (in contrast with the very open
and pluralist German media system). Hence, the intro-
duction of political and/or discursive opportunity struc-
tures should help explain the expansion or contraction
of conflicts within and across settings.
A modest research agenda should therefore primar-
ily aim to disentangle (through theory-testing process-
tracing or qualitative comparative analysis) which combi-
nation of variables (or which mechanisms) explain ‘com-
prehensive’ politicization. Such a case-based research de-
sign is all the more important given that these ‘com-
prehensive’ phenomena might take place much less fre-
quently than we think. Kiiver (2007) even argues that
we can at best expect ‘targeted’ politicization: some spe-
cific EU policies, which attract deliberate attention by
national parliaments, while the bulk of policies pass un-
noticed. This is in line with the idea that politicization
is essentially about how public and political attention—
a scarce resource—flows (Palonen et al., 2019). A cer-
tain politicized issue might detract attention, resources,
and debate from another, pre-empting a comparative
analysis of different issues. A qualitative research agenda
unpacking the dynamics of successful ‘comprehensive’
politicized issues is, therefore, better suited than large
N projects.
5. Conclusions
In this contribution, I have looked at the phenomena of
(behavioural) parliamentarization and politicization from
a conceptual and analytical angle in order to set the
scene for the empirical contributions in this special issue.
The key point I put forward is simple, but arguably often
overlooked: We can and should be seeing (behavioural)
parliamentarization as a necessary, yet insufficient, com-
ponent of a wider politicization phenomenon, and not
as separate processes that react to each other. By con-
cisely reviewing both literature strands and deconstruct-
ing these concepts, I have first of all shown that this is
perfectly possible, analytically speaking.
With a further focus on the communicative aspects
of behavioural parliamentarization and politicization,
I have argued that we also should be seeing these as
tightly interwoven, as it: (i) goes beyond ad hoc or pars
pro toto theoretical assumptions in each separate litera-
ture strand; (ii) sheds new light on the normative conse-
quences scholars usually attach to both; and (iii) helps ad-
vance a more complete understanding and explanation
of these phenomena.
There are of course several limitations to this con-
tribution. First of all, I have only focused on the role
and activities of national parliaments, while their func-
tioning and behaviour is also dependent on the place
they have been granted (or carve out for themselves)
in a multi-level parliamentary system. The relationship
between these different levels is complex, even without
questioning what multi-level politicization would look
like (see Crum & Fossum, 2009). This contribution hope-
fully serves as a conceptual and analytical stepping stone
for further research dealing with these complexities.
Secondly, as Table 1 shows, the citizen setting is also
identified as a location for politicization to unfold, yet
this is under-researched. An important consideration is
if we should take this setting into account as well to
make sure that any ‘comprehensive politicization’ we
might witness, does not take place before a ‘blind audi-
ence’. While it makes sense to assume that issues that
are contested simultaneously in parliament and in the
mass media are also on the public’s attention radar, we
cannot rule out the possibility that citizens’ changingme-
dia intake (e.g., through social media) fractures these
links, and hence impacts the normative consequences at-
tached to comprehensive politicization.
Thirdly, the current contribution identifies overlap
predominantly in terms of the location and manifesta-
tions of politicization and parliamentarization but says
little about the content of the debates that are being
held. Any beneficial normative consequences attached
to these phenomena obviously also depend on the way
the EU is debated, and if position-taking and framing fol-
low traditional political cleavages or if new ones are es-
tablished (see e.g., Wendler, 2013). While it is here im-
plied that contestation or ‘polarization’ is present as a
necessary sub-process of politicization (and can arguably
be seen as an empirical likelihood), empirical research
should verify this in parallel, instead of only looking at
where discursive interventions take place.
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